

30 NOV 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director 

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SUBJECT : Post Mortem on Lessons Learned

REFERENCE : ED Memo to all Members of the Senior Staff,  
dtd 5 Nov 62, same subject

1. Attached are comments prepared by the Offices of Communications, Security, Logistics and Personnel. The Office of Training, Medical Staff and Automatic Data Processing Staff had nothing to report.

2. The problem areas identified are under continuing study and, as you will note, we have taken or are undertaking such actions as we practically can to effect improvements in the DD/S area. We will be glad to comment as may be necessary on problems of Agency-wide importance.

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L. K. White  
Deputy Director  
(Support)

## 4 Atts:

- Att 1: Memo to ED fm D/CO, dtd 23 Nov 62,  
subj: Post Mortem on Lessons Learned
- Att 2: Memo to ED fm D/Sec, dtd 21 Nov 62, subj:  
as above
- Att 3: Memo to DD/S fm D/Lo, dtd 23 Nov 62,  
subj: as above
- Att 4: Memo to Mr.  fm  dtd  
20 Nov 62, subj: as above

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on Lessons Learned

REFERENCE : Your Memo dtd 5 Nov 1962 same subject.

1. The Office of Communications has been greatly affected by the events of the past few weeks. Many of the requirements levied on this office were taken in stride, but others--particularly those that came from outside CIA--were entirely unexpected and hence we were not fully prepared to meet all of them with available assets. Those assets we had have been largely expended against crisis requirements with the result that vital portions of our pre-crisis program may suffer. The basic "lessons learned" are that a reserve of trained personnel should be available at all times and that larger Agency stocks of modern cryptographic, agent, and staff communications equipment should be available and on hand against contingencies. Further, modernization plans should be speeded up and not phased over a three or four year period as previously conceived. In order to reap the benefit of these lessons however, it will be necessary to increase personnel ceilings and expenditures for equipment substantially above those currently programmed.

2. As you know, during this period we were directed to absorb a major communications workload in Latin America and elsewhere in the world by the Communications Sub-committee of the National Security Council. These requirements stemmed primarily from the lack of rapid and secure com-

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The majority of purely CIA requirements could have been met during this period without any particular difficulty. Inter-relations of State/Military/CIA communications shows that we can no longer think, plan, or act on a wholly unilateral basis.

3. The following discussion points out the major areas where deficiencies have been discovered. Further details and specific recommendations on each subject will be prepared if you desire:

a. Personnel. Two main categories of personnel were required beyond our on-board strength, namely radio operators and technicians. Attempts were made during this period to obtain military personnel as operators and commercial Tech Rep personnel as technicians. In both

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instances we were only partially successful in that personnel thus obtained were not fully qualified and when obtained could not be put to immediate employment as they were not cleared for CIA use. It is recommended that personnel ceilings be adjusted so that we can operate normally on a non-overtime basis and that a reserve of qualified personnel that can be called on short notice be developed.

b. Equipment. Several categories of equipment were found to be in short supply during this period:

(1) Voice Secrecy Equipment. A more extensive and flexible secure voice communications system is required in the Washington area.

This is not a requirement peculiar to the Agency, but one that is common to all of official Washington.

(2) Cryptographic Equipment. Although we had anticipated the need for a very fast, efficient, and modern cryptographic system in support of staff communications, we found ourselves only part way through our cryptographic modernization program when the crisis began. At the present rate our programming for this equipment will take us at least three or four years to complete. The basic problem is that this equipment is expensive and difficult to finance out of our limited year to year operating budget. We are now preparing a thorough study to determine where we stand over-all on this problem. As soon as this study is completed, we will prepare a paper on the subject for presentation to determine the appropriate course of action.

(3) Radio and Teletype terminal Equipment. In this area also we were caught part way through our modernization program when the crisis began. As a result, we have expended a majority of our warehouse stocks to meet the crisis requirements levied on us by the NSC. It will be necessary to re-order such equipment to meet current pre-crisis requirements. It is recommended that means be found to stock such equipment beyond such current requirements so that equipment will be on hand to meet crises as they develop. Had the current crisis occurred at the end of the Fiscal Year instead of near the beginning, we would have found it impossible to meet our commitments.

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(4) Agent Equipment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] By production of some items at our own small R & D facility and by "flag-waving" with contractors and payment of overtime we are meeting this requirement. The lesson learned is that our stock procurement quantities of modern agent equipment is too low. Experience during this crisis and during previous years has shown that it is better to over-buy this category of equipment than to under-buy.

4. In retrospect, the past few weeks illustrated that our basic system and organization can react to crisis situations if they are not too big and if they occur only one at a time. We do not have reserve capacity sufficient for simultaneous large crises or a hot war. The creation of the National Communications sub-committees absorbed practically the full time of seven of our senior people in committee meetings for three weeks. During this time we still had sufficient depth of staff officer personnel to carry on implementation actions on a world-wide basis. Our recommendations stemming from this period are made in terms of being prepared in the future to meet rapidly increasing requirements with available assets of equipment and personnel whether they occur simultaneously in several parts of the world and whether they occur at the beginning or the end of a given Fiscal Year.

[REDACTED]

Director of Communications

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Critique on Week of Crisis

REFERENCES : (a) Executive Director Memo of 5 November 1962,  
Subject: Post Mortem on Lessons Learned  
(b) Executive Assistant to the DD(S) Memo of  
9 November 1962, Subject: Post Mortem on  
Lessons Learned

1. This memorandum is for information and also contains recommendations for consideration in Section I, paragraphs D, E, and F.

2. This memorandum is divided into two Sections. Section I sets forth comments deemed to be of overall Agency importance, and Section II comments referring to Office of Security problems.

#### SECTION I: Agency Problems

A. During the week of crisis, substantial effort was exerted in planning against requirements and needs of the Agency. Difficulty was encountered in this important area by the lack of sufficient available information concerning the purpose, nature, and extent of the activities planned for the [redacted]

[redacted] The same type of problem was encountered in planning for the protection and support of Agency domestic operations to be conducted away from [redacted] and general Headquarters area. It has always been assumed that substantial requirements for security protection and support would be levied by overseas stations and bases. Efforts to plan in this area were also rendered difficult by the lack of precise information. We are vitally concerned with Agency plans for regrouping of personnel and, at this time, we are not aware of where or how this will be accomplished.

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C. Recent experience has demonstrated the need for further orientation and training regarding emergency problems. Requirements for added equipment also became evident. Accordingly, a program has been instituted to hold periodic meetings of Office Relocation Forces, the Security Patrol, and the Emergency Stand-by Team. Plans are being formulated to provide for instruction in the use of the gas mask, complete familiarity with the physical features of Headquarters Building and relocation sites, fire fighting, radiation detection, and first aid. Surveys are current to determine the types and quantities of equipment necessary for training and for emergency operations.


D. Analysis of the Office of Security staff in terms of emergency requirements leads clearly to the conclusion that we are not staffed to meet all responsibilities. Accordingly, plans have been undertaken to assess our requirements and to request, through appropriate Agency channels, military assistance, particularly in the area of guarding and general protection responsibilities.

E. The lack of adequate communications facilities for the Security Patrol and the overall emergency operations of the Office appeared critical. Accordingly, a study has been undertaken to analyze our requirements to determine the necessary equipment and systems and to implement the study to the point of solution.

F. We have become aware of the need for mobility and transport which might arise during a catastrophe of serious proportions. This problem is being pursued with consideration being given to obtaining a better potential for the emergency use of various types of transport equipment and obtaining necessary passes and credentials from the Office of Civil Defense.

G. Further Security planning is necessary for each Agency relocation site and for all areas housing Agency personnel during an emergency. Present plans have been reviewed, and action has been taken to conduct real surveys designed to bring up to date the plans for these areas.

H. The adequacy of our vital storage materials program has been reviewed, and it has been concluded that this program must be intensified. This will be done.

  
Sherfield Edwards  
Director of Security

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